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lectronic discovery refers to the requesting and acquiring 
of digitally based documents during pre-trial discovery. 
Since a 1970 amendment to Rule 34 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, courts have uniformly held that 
computerized data may be subject to discovery rules. 
Though discovery rules are clearly applicable to elec-
tronic discovery, no one can agree on what to call the field. It has 
been referred to as ED, EDD, digital discovery, e-discovery (with or 
without a hyphen) and as I simply describe it – electronic discovery. 
While electronic discovery is not a new phenomenon for some prac-
titioners and private discovery firms, it is cutting edge enough that 
there is not even a standard name for the legal genre. 
Recent court decisions reveal the need for standard rules 
within the federal courts for dealing with electronic discovery. 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to deal with 
the issue have been proposed, and it is expected there will be vigor-
ous public debate as to the final structure of any amendment or 
whether the rules should be amended at all. 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys, led by the American Trial Lawyers 
Association, argue there is no need for adding special amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They argue information is 
information and rules governing paper discovery are equally appli-
cable to the electronic variety. 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys are likely candidates for placing initial dis-
covery requests for electronic documents. It is understandable they 
would not want special rules to develop that might hinder their abil-
ity to access these documents or increase the costs of such actions. 
However, their stance flies in the face of the many fundamental 
differences between printed and electronic information as well as 
between traditional business methods and the modern world of 
technology. 
Many large corporations, insurance providers and defense 
attorneys endorse the development of special rules and guidelines 
pertaining to electronic discovery. 
Most importantly, they would like safe harbors that would allow 
for the regular destruction of electronic documents during the nor-
mal course of business and a shifting of costs back to the requesting 
party if recovery was too costly. This would effectively deny many 
plaintiffs access to potentially pertinent information. Alternatively, 
it may shift a great financial burden to requesting parties should 
they want access to certain electronic records. 
The better policy is to provide for new rules that acknowledge 
the fundamental differences between electronic documents and 
paper documents and provide specific guidelines as to how they 
should be handled. This would ensure the courts are not left to 
make ad-hoc decisions or adopt competing tests to make important 
determinations.
The proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
represent an important realization that electronic discovery is differ-
ent and it needs special rules and standards to guide attorneys, parties 
and judges. While some provisions of the amendments are wise and 
require little change, others may need to be re-thought so this ball 
that is rolling towards a very important finish line creates rules that 
solve problems and does not create new ones.
Background
Usage of electronic data 
To understand why electronic discovery has become such an 
invaluable part of litigation, it is important to understand the scope 
of electronic document usage in the United States. 
The volume of potential electronic evidence continues to rise 
each year and e-mail usage is beginning to replace many traditional 
phone conversations. Use of e-mail in the business setting has grown 
immensely in the past 10 years and is now a primary form of business 
communication. Estimates have placed the total number of e-mails 
sent each day at 31 billion. 
Another study estimates that 93 percent of actual documents 
currently generated are in electronic form, and only 30 percent of 
those documents are ever produced in hard copy. Instead of being 
converted to paper, an estimated 70 percent of these electronic 
documents are being created, revised, modified and stored entirely 
in electronic form. 
Documents that do make it to paper are most often printed from 
a computer, which means the information exists in electronic form 
as well as paper.
The ability of modern technology to store huge amounts of 
digital information has created discovery dilemmas. Possibly the 
most critical issue is that as the volume of evidence a party wishes to 
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discover grows, so grows the costs inherent to its discovery. 
While there is currently no uniform list of the many types of 
electronic information subject to discovery, numerous types of infor-
mation can and have been considered. 
Compared to their paper counterparts, electronic documents are 
much more difficult to eliminate. Paper documents can be shred-
ded into tiny pieces. But, deleted electronic documents, especially 
e-mail, usually continue to be stored on hard drives or other storage 
devices.
It is a common misunderstanding that once a user deletes a 
document from his/her personal computer it cannot be recovered. 
The reality is that when the user deletes a file, only the indexing for 
the file is removed, leaving the file itself until it is overwritten or a 
software program is used to cleanse the drive of these files. 
Since 90 percent or more of business documents are created in 
digital form, it becomes quite likely that even shredded paper docu-
ments have digital counterparts waiting to be discovered. 
Many corporate electronic systems employ a scheduled backup 
system that duplicates information to backup tape drives, where the 
documents will likely be retained until the corporate schedule calls 
for their erasure. 
Unlike paper records, electronic documents are often dynamic 
and cannot simply be secured at the onset of litigation. These records 
may be continuously modified or even deleted subject to routine 
destruction policies businesses may have in place. 
While paper documents subject to discovery are often found in 
filing cabinets or boxes, electronic documents could exist in any 
number of environments and mediums. Numerous copies of the 
very same document can end up in many different places within a 
company’s umbrella. 
One major hurdle to developing and following any rules for 
electronic discovery is that many attorneys and their clients simply 
do not understand its implications. Attorneys who are skilled in the 
ways of electronic discovery hope to use it to find the “silver bullet” 
which could win a case or force an opponent’s hand in settlement. 
Increasingly, e-mails are providing crucial pieces of evidence for 
litigators. In one case, computer forensics engineers were able to 
recover an e-mail from one company employee to another discussing 
the side effects of the drug Fen-phen. 
The e-mail reportedly read, “Do I have to look forward to spend-
ing my waning years writing checks to fat people worried about a 
silly lung problem?” The estimated $3.7 billion settlement reached in 
this case was among the largest ever against a U.S. company.
A case like this encourages other attorneys to utilize elec-
tronic discovery to find information that would otherwise 
have remained hidden. 
Types of electronic documents
User created electronic documents 
These	are	documents	created	by	a	computer	user,	including	word	processing	docu-
ments	like	those	made	in	Microsoft	Word	or	WordPerfect,	spreadsheets	and	presenta-
tions.	
E-mail		
Unlike	interaction	via	telephone,	e-mail	creates	a	discoverable	record.	E-mail	is	easily	
distributed	to	any	number	of	recipients	and	is	stored	on	both	the	sender’s	and	the	
recipient’s	computers.	
Hidden data or meta-data		
Information	that	is	often	created	and	maintained	on	a	computer	that	was	not	
intentionally	created	by	the	user	but	was	automatically	created	or	modified	by	the	
computer	itself.	This	includes	information	in	documents	that	is	unavailable	when	one	
looks	only	at	the	hardcopy	of	the	document.	Meta-data	provides	information	like	
the	date,	time	and	person(s)	accessing	a	document	or	a	network,	the	edit	history	of	
a	document,	the	existence	of	previous	and	subsequent	e-mails	in	a	chain	of	e-mails,	
and	hidden	comments	that	can	explain	changes	in	documents	or	authenticate	them.	
Learning	this	information	can	help	determine	the	timing	of	certain	revisions	of	a	doc-
ument,	identify	recipients	of	the	document	and	reveal	any	indications	of	document	
tampering.
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Rules Governing Electronic Discovery 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
While the scope of potentially discoverable evidence expands with 
technology, the rules governing the discovery of electronic evidence 
in the federal courts, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, have 
remained still. As one commentator has put it, “when it comes to 
electronic evidence, it seems that the law changes slowly or not at 
all.” To this day, electronic evidence is subjected to rules that were 
created to solve problems associated with paperbound discovery. 
One of the main purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
is to promote efficiency. Rule 1 states the rules “shall be construed 
and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determi-
nation of every action.” 
With this underlying intent of promot-
ing efficiency in mind, I turn our attention 
toward Rules 26 and 34, which govern 
the discovery of electronic media. Rule 26 
provides for initial disclosures of “all docu-
ments, data compilations, and tangible 
things” the disclosing party may use to sup-
port its claims or defenses. Rule 34 goes on 
to broadly define “documents” as including 
electronic data.
Rule 34 was amended in 1970 in recog-
nition of the need to include information 
in electronic form within the scope of the 
rules governing discovery. It was amended 
to provide that, upon request, a party is 
required to produce “any designated doc-
uments,” including “writings, drawings, 
graphs, charts, photographs, phonorecords, 
and other data compilations from which 
information can be obtained.” 
The original version of Rule 34(a) only 
permitted a party to request the production 
of “documents” or “tangible things.” 
The 1970 amendment adjusted the def-
inition of “documents” to include a wide 
description of electronic data to adequately 
reflect the changes in technology. 
While not specifically naming “comput-
er data,” it makes it clear that Rule 34 now applies to electronic data 
compilations from which information can only be obtained with the 
use of detection devices. Rule 34 does not address issues related to 
the manner in which information is to be disclosed.
In continuation of Rule 1’s policy of promoting efficiency, Rule 
26 protects parties from unduly burdensome, unnecessary or inef-
ficient discovery. 
While the literal language of Rule 26 is silent on electronic docu-
ments, the advisory notes clarify that disclosures “include computer-
ized data and other electronically-recorded information ... .” Rule 
26 operates to relieve the burden placed on responding parties by 
prohibiting cumulative or duplicative discovery requests. 
However, Rule 26 does not directly provide us with guidance 
about how much information a party must actually produce or 
which party should bear the expenses of a potentially costly elec-
tronic discovery request.
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure 
The U.S. Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure has sought to answer the above questions and others 
in their recent draft of proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure governing the discovery of electronic documents. 
Published in August 2004 by a standing committee of the judicial 
conference, the proposed changes would modify rules 16 (Pretrial 
Conferences), 26 (General Provisions), 33 (Interrogatories), 34 
(Production of Documents), 37 (Sanctions) and 45 (Subpoenas). 
Some of the proposed changes have near universal support, while 
others have been publicly criticized. 
In the past year, the proposed amendments have been approved 
by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, 
the Standing Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure and, on September 
20, the Judicial Conference approved the 
amendments. They will now be consid-
ered by the U.S. Supreme Court and then 
are subject to review by Congress. 
Below, I discuss a few of the proposed 
amendments as promulgated by the Civil 
Rules Advisory Committee and suggest 
important points of discussion and pos-
sible changes that should be made before 
this process is foreclosed. 
After public debate, some minor 
changes and notes have been added to 
the proposed amendments. In some cases, 
the rule makers have taken into account 
the type of issues I have raised below. 
The final version of proposed amend-
ments submitted to the Supreme Court 
can be found at http://www.uscourts.
gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf. 
The various changes to the federal rules 
are intended to focus on five main areas of 
electronic discovery. First, the proposed 
changes deal with the need of early atten-
tion in potential litigation to electronic 
discovery issues. Second, they seek to 
adapt rules 33, 34 and 45 to electronic discovery. Third, they provide 
procedures for asserting privilege after the inadvertent production of 
privileged information. Fourth, they deal with limiting discovery of 
electronic information that is not reasonably accessible. Lastly, they 
deal with sanctions against parties for the spoliation of electronically 
stored information.
Arguably, the most controversial proposed amendment is the 
added subdivision (f) of Rule 37. As promulgated by the Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee, the rule would provide that “unless a court 
order requiring preservation of electronically stored information is 
violated, the court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a 
party when such information is lost because of the routine operations 
of its electronic information system if the party took reasonable steps 
to preserve discoverable evidence.” Such an amendment is favored 
by large corporations, but is a matter of contention for plaintiffs’ 
attorneys. 
It	has	become	obvious	from	
the	burgeoning	case	law	
on	the	subject	of	electronic	
discovery	that	the	time	has	
come	for	the	drafters	of	
the	Federal	Rules	of	Civil	
Procedure	to	step	up	and	
set	this	house	in	order.	
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The changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will go into 
effect on Dec. 1, 2006, should they be approved, with or without 
revisions, by the U.S. Supreme Court, and then Congress. 
Common Law Principles 
Two major concerns regarding electronic discovery today are: (1) 
what happens to a party when they are found to have improperly dis-
posed of digital evidence? and (2) who needs to pay for all of this? 
Spoliation 
Spoliation has been described in the federal courts as the destruc-
tion or alteration of evidence or the failure to properly preserve 
evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation. Spoliation, 
resulting from the use of electronic evidence, is an issue that has not 
been directly addressed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
As documents become more frequently maintained in electronic 
form, it has become much easier to delete or alter this evidence 
and much more difficult for litigants to craft policies to ensure all 
relevant documents to reasonably foreseeable litigation are properly 
preserved. 
Unfortunately, examples of spoliation and sanctions for the 
destruction of electronic evidence are all too common. A recent case 
on the subject has received a great deal of attention. 
In Zubulake	v.	UBS	Warburg1, an instruction of an adverse infer-
ence was granted against a company for deleting relevant e-mails 
during a discovery period that had lasted for two years. U.S. District 
Judge Shira Scheindlin determined the harsh sanction of an adverse 
inference was appropriate given the depth of the defendant’s refusal 
to turn over certain documents and the deletion of others.
Scheindlin scolded the defendants and their attorneys for not 
monitoring the discovery situation more closely. The judge con-
cluded UBS employees acted willfully in destroying relevant infor-
mation and determined it was not sufficient for counsel to just notify 
employees there was a litigation hold on documents. From this 
action alone, counsel could not have reasonably expected that UBS 
would retain and produce all relevant information to the litigation. 
Cost-shifting 
A party’s justifiable concerns over the cost of electronic discovery 
lead to the issues of (1) what costs, if any, should be shifted from a 
responding party to the requesting party and (2) when these cost 
shifts should properly occur. 
In Rowe	 Entertainment	 Inc.	 v.	William	Morris	 Agency	 Inc.2, the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York set forth 
an eight-factor test to determine the extent to which the cost of 
electronic discovery should be shifted to requesting parties. The 
defendants in the case estimated the production of e-mail backups 
would cost between $250,000-400,000 and asked the plaintiffs to 
take on these costs. 
The court utilized a complicated eight-factor balancing test and 
determined the factors weighed heavily in favor of shifting the costs 
of production onto the plaintiffs, while requiring the defendants to 
bear the costs of reviewing the documents. 
In 2003, Zubulake modified the Rowe factors and divided the 
analysis into typically accessible forms of data and “inaccessible 
data.” The court concluded data contained in readable formats on a 
machine is typically accessible and must be produced at the expense of 
the producing party. Inaccessible data, like backup tapes, may require 
the requesting party to fund part of the financial burden of retrieval. 
This decision reasoned that discovery does not automatically 
become burdensome merely because electronic evidence is involved. 
The court recognized that “cost-shifting may effectively end discov-
ery, especially when private parties are engaged in litigation with large 
corporations.” 
To determine whether to shift the costs of production, the court 
laid out its own seven-factor test, which has been influential in 
academic and judicial circles. The test includes such factors as the 
availability of the information and the cost of production relative to 
the amount in controversy. 
Argument
It has become obvious from the burgeoning case law on the 
subject of electronic discovery that the time has come for the draft-
ers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to step up and set this 
house in order. To an extent, it is necessary for the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure to take the rulemaking process out of the hands of 
district courts so that a common rule can prevail, and parties can rest 
a little easier knowing they might have some semblance of order and 
protection. 
Some argue that new standards are not necessary. In comments 
submitted to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, the ATLA extolled the position that there should be no 
revision to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding electronic 
discovery. 
The body argues that rather than a change in the federal rules, we 
should provide education for judges who are unfamiliar with specific 
technical matters. 
The association also endorses relying on case law to save the day, 
comparing the challenge of developing standards for electronic evi-
dence to earlier challenges with product liability, patent and antitrust 
litigation. 
It also does not see “computer-based information” as a specific 
problem, likening it to the technological breakthrough of the pho-
tocopier, an advancement that did not require changes to the federal 
rules.
However, the ATLA’s view does not properly account for the 
inherently different nature of electronic documents from paper 
documents. 
Without action to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the matter would be left entirely on the laps of the federal courts. 
There is no way to predict whether courts will impose broad or nar-
row obligations to preserve and produce electronic documents. 
Different courts may impose different standards based on similar 
factual circumstances. This could turn what is for some litigators an 
already confusing technological situation into an even greater enigma 
when it comes to standards on such important rulings as spoliation. 
Another wholly separate reason for wanting to amend the rules is 
to avoid obstructionalist tactics. There is a fear that where responding 
parties have previously tended to dump more paper documents on a 
requesting party than they could possibly handle, with the increased 
ability to search some electronic documents, responding parties will 
now do all they can to limit production. 
The existence of rules and standards that specifically deal with 
electronic discovery’s most basic elements will likely give obstructing 
parties less to hide behind. 
Therefore, there is good reason to amend the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in targeted ways that provide guidance to the courts 
and litigants regarding notable issues in electronic discovery, but in 
ways that do not encourage and support obstructionalist tactics. 
The proposed Rule 34(b) may be the most advisable, in principle, 
of all of those proposed. In my opinion, however, it contains an ill-
advised default provision. 
The proposed rule would allow a requesting party to designate 
the form in which it wants electronic data produced. Because of 
the varying forms in which electronic data can be produced, this 
becomes a more important element than with paper discovery. If 
the requesting party desires, they can request that electronic data be 
produced in hard copy format. 
There is, however, a default provision in the proposed rule where, 
if no specific form is requested, the responding party must produce 
the information in the manner it is usually maintained (presumably 
its “native” format) or in a searchable form. 
The Microsoft Corporation, in commentary sent to the Advisory 
Committee on Rules, revealed their displeasure over this provision. 
Microsoft states it is their belief that “the rules should not favor or 
specify any particular format of production.” They suggest a rule 
where the requesting party can specify a form of production, but if 
the parties do not concur to the method, it would be brought to the 
attention of the court, which would presumably decide the form of 
production. 
In my opinion, the greatest value in this provision is that it gives 
a degree of power to the party who requests a specific format. If the 
requesting party asks for production in “.doc” files or other search-
able text files, the responding party would be obligated to comply. 
I can imagine a situation in the electronic context, similar to a 
party requesting a single paper file only to receive a warehouse full 
of documents in return, of a party asking for information without 
specifying format receiving their information in a format that is 
unreadable to the human eye, like ASCII.
Proposed Rule 26(b)(2) would allow that a responding party 
would not need to provide the discovery of electronic information 
that is not “reasonably accessible.” It is a well-accepted principle that 
even deleted electronic information is subject to electronic discovery. 
Deleted information may be quite difficult and costly to recover. 
A rule allowing a party to effectively render documents un-discover-
able until a court says otherwise could be read to conflict with this 
notion that information, even deleted, must be produced. 
However, as discussed in Zubulake, the rationale behind cost-shift-
ing was in understanding that some electronic data may be “inacces-
sible” and the requesting party may need to want the evidence so 
badly they will cough up money, just to receive the information. 
The Zubulake court did express fears that large companies would 
move towards paper free environments and that a frequent use of 
cost-shifting would have a crippling effect on discovery in discrimi-
nation and retaliation cases. 
Also of significant consideration are the genuine fears that corpo-
rations and insurance companies, typical responding parties, have. 
Theresa M. Marchlewski, first vice president and senior counsel 
of Washington Mutual Bank, in her comments to the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules, explained how she is often required 
by the courts to produce information of “marginal relevance but 
extremely costly to obtain.” These experiences are echoed in a num-
ber of responses to the committee. 
On its own, Rule 26(b)(2) is a sensible, possibly necessary, rule to 
make the process of electronic discovery reasonable for responding 
parties. However, its application, in light of proposed Rule 37(f), 
calls into question the more sinister ways these two provisions could 
interact. 
Proposed Rule 37(f) seeks to create a “safe harbor” provision from 
discovery sanctions for a party that fails to produce electronically 
stored information if that party “took reasonable steps” to preserve 
discoverable information and this failure resulted from routine oper-
ation of the party’s electronic information system. The committee 
notes to the proposed rule point out that it only addresses sanctions 
for the loss of electronic data after the commencement of an action. 
While the rule would create a “reasonableness” standard to weigh 
what the party knew or should have known when it took (or did 
not take) steps to preserve electronic information, it does nothing to 
protect data prior to the commencement of an action. 
If a producing party has a liberal deletion policy for electronic 
data, prior to the commencement of legal action, this could easily 
make electronic evidence “inaccessible.” 
If the evidence is then “inaccessible,” it would be protected by 
proposed Rule 26(b)(2) and the requesting party would need to 
show cause to force the producing party to give up the information. 
Further, under the current status of cost-shifting after Zubulake, 
the costs or part of the costs of retrieving this “inaccessible” data can 
be shifted back to the requesting party. 
This would give many potential defendants (often large corpora-
tions) the ability to burden plaintiffs seeking information by making 
evidence inaccessible as to qualify for protection and cost-shifting. 
As such, at a minimum, Rule 26(b)(2) may need to further define 
“reasonably accessible” so it does not become an excuse not to offer 
a plaintiff relevant records.
It is possible that the biggest problem with proposed Rule 37(f) 
is not with the rule itself, but with the lack of sound electronic reten-
tion standards. Some businesses are required by state or federal law 
to retain certain electronic documents for specified periods of time. 
However, the policies are not as clear for other business documents. 
Unless there are wholesale changes in the electronic document 
retention policies of many businesses, there is no place in the amend-
ed rules for the safe harbor provision of Rule 37(f). 
Conclusion
When all is said and done, the proposed amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are just that – proposals. They 
are an excellent starting point and represent the consciousness that 
something needs to be done to right this ship. If these rules are going 
to be successful and fair, however, they need to address the unique-
ness of electronic discovery from paper discovery, but protect both 
the requesting parties and responding parties as well as third parties 
and employees who are affected. 
Endnotes
1 Zubulake	v.	UBS	Warburg, 382 F. Supp. 2d 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
2 Rowe	Entertainment	Inc.	v.	William	Morris	Agency	Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
13	 AdvocateFall	2005/Winter	2006
